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Fish’s Five Theories 
Frederick Schauer 
The title of this Comment is tendentious.  Or perhaps “annoying” 
would be the better word.  And the reason that the title is tendentious or 
annoying is that Professor Fish has developed his substantial and well-
deserved academic reputation partially on the basis of his squeamishness 
about, or downright hostility to, theory and theories.  There are actions, 
habits, and, above all, practices, Fish insists, but there are not theories.  
Thus Fish proudly calls himself a “theory minimalist,”1 and seems not to 
mind very much being linked with those who are simply “against theory,”2 
even if he might not put it exactly that way himself.  For Fish, there is just 
what we do, and we don’t do what we do any better by theorizing about it, 
and we don’t understand practices any better by theorizing about them.  Or 
at least so Fish has frequently insisted.3  And thus to accuse him of having 
five theories is both to deny much of the import of his own previous 
academic work and also to accuse him of being quintuply confused.  To 
accuse Fish of having five theories is thus not an accusation to be hurled 
casually. 
Yet despite Fish’s denial of being in the theory business, at least under 
his understanding of what theory is, his careful, thoughtful, persuasive, and 
substantially correct analysis of academic freedom is constructed on top of 
five different theories – a theory of jobs, a theory of university employment, 
a theory of free speech, a theory of rights, and a theory of the role of the 
judiciary.  Each of these theories contains more than a germ of truth, but 
they are theories nonetheless, and in this brief paper my principal goal is to 
bring these buried theories to the surface so that they can be subjected to 
closer inspection. 
 
  David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. 
1 Stanley Fish, Theory Minimalism, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761 (2000). 
2 E.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 (1982). 
3 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, 
TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES (1990); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND 
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989). 
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I 
Professor Fish claims to be the charter and perhaps even sole member 
of the “It’s just a job” school of academic freedom.4  And his perspective is 
refreshing.  Fish and I each have more than forty years’ experience in 
listening to our fellow academics spew pretentious and sanctimonious 
statements about the vital importance of the academic enterprise, and too 
much listening to too much of this inflated claptrap – we don’t hear it from 
dentists, despite the fact that a world without dentists would be nasty, 
brutish, short, and very painful – should cause anyone of sound mind to 
search for a deflationary strategy.5  Fish has discovered it in the “It’s just a 
job” approach to academic freedom, and he should be applauded for its 
deflationary attitude, even if for nothing else. 
In order to make the “It’s just a job” claim, however, one needs an 
account – that is, a theory – of just what a job is, and it is by no means clear 
that Fish’s understanding of the very nature of a job is beyond dispute.  
Indeed, after having announced that academic employment is “just a job,” 
Fish then proceeds to tell us what the job is.  I will deal with the substance 
of that claim in the next section, but even before we get to that, we need to 
take note of the fact that Fish, the employee, is purporting to explain the 
nature of the job.  But under another understanding of just what a job is, it 
is the employer and not the help who gets to define the nature of the job.  If 
it really is just a job, then the definition of the job is entirely in the hands of 
the employer.  The employees – the help6 – can refuse to take the job.  We 
do have the Thirteenth Amendment, after all. But a seemingly common 
account of what a job is defines it as the performance of a task as set by the 
employer in exchange for wages or their equivalent.  Take it or leave it. 
I do not claim that foregoing account of the nature of a job is 
necessarily correct.  I admit to thinking it has a certain kind of resonance, 
and I admit to being attracted by the fact that this account is rather more 
deflationary than even Fish’s.  But once we see that this conception of a job 
– a conception in which the help do not get to define what a job is – stands 
as a plausible competitor to Fish’s conception, it becomes apparent that 
Fish’s conception of a job is heavily laden with a theory of just what a job 
is. 
 
4 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16) (on file with FIU Law Review). 
5 And, as I have noted before, listening to academics trumpet the virtues of academic freedom is 
somewhat akin to listening to Saudis or Texans talk about the virtues of oil, or, for that matter, listening 
to journalists talk about the value of freedom of the press.  Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to 
Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006). 
6 A term rather more deflationary than “employee,” and much more deflationary than 
“professional.” 
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Indeed, the point becomes stronger once we notice that Fish glides 
smoothly from his “It’s just a job” view to the idea that those who hold the 
job are also members of a profession.  But there are also professional 
housekeepers, professional butlers, professional soldiers, and professional 
exterminators.  Embedded in Fish’s understanding of a professional is the 
view that professionals have a responsibility to their profession and not just 
to their immediate employers, in a way that “mere” employees do not.7  
Again, this account of what it is to be a professional seems right, but now 
the “It’s just a job” view is exposed not merely as theory-laden, but 
potentially simply false.  To say that it is just a job is to say that there are no 
employer-independent responsibilities to the profession or to professional 
norms, but precisely the existence of such independent or external (to the 
employment relationship) responsibilities is what Fish wants to maintain.  
Yes, professionals like lawyers, doctors, and rocket scientists have jobs, but 
the very fact that they have commitments to professional standards and 
norms and practices apart from their commitments to their employers 
means that they exist in a world different from the world of those 
employees whose responsibilities are exhausted by the requirements 
imposed by their employer.  Academics, like rocket scientists, do have such 
employer-independent responsibilities, but the very fact that they do means 
that their employment is more than, and not simply coextensive with, their 
job in the narrower sense.  If the employees are professionals, then their 
employment is more than just a job, unless we have a theory of a job – as 
Fish seems to have – that is substantially thicker than the notion of a job 
held by millions of people who have jobs and the millions who employ 
them. 
II 
Even if we accept that academics are plausibly professionals – and 
thus that being an academic is to have a job but not just a job – there is then 
the question of just what it is to be an academic.  Or, for that matter, what it 
is to be a professional academic, or to be a member of the academic 
profession.  Thus the question is transformed into one of attempting to 
determine just what kind of job the job of being an academic is.  Even if the 
contours and nature of the job are not just the requirements and 
specifications set by the employer, as both Fish and I agree, then how 
should we understand the job of the academic? 
Here, Fish and I again are substantially in agreement, except insofar as 
Fish might deny that there is a real question here and so might deny that 
something most accurately called a “theory” is embedded in the choice of 
 
7 FISH, supra note 4, at 37. 
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one conception of academic employment rather than some number of 
others.  For Fish, to be an academic is to have a certain mindset, a mindset 
or attitude or vocation of seeking understanding, or knowledge, or 
enlightenment, or even (Fish would almost certainly not use the word, 
except with scare quotes) truth.  To be an academic is for Fish not to be a 
political activist, and not to be an actor in an ideological theatrical 
performance, and not to be a crusader for an ideological or social goal, even 
though one might be a crusader for one’s view of the truth, academically 
defined. 
This is an attractive vision of the vocation of the academic, but, once 
again, it is not the only vision.  Indeed, the very fact that Fish chooses to 
distinguish between the academic and the teacher is revealing.  After all, he, 
like most of us in his line of work, has probably had the experience on 
multiple occasions of being trapped in an airline seat next to someone who 
inquires into what we do, and, upon being informed that we are university 
professors of some stripe, is delighted to inform us that they have a cousin, 
niece, nephew, neighbor, or whomever who is a fourth grade arithmetic 
teacher, thus thinking (and supposing that we think) that there is some 
similarity between being a professor of English literature at a research 
university and being a fourth grade arithmetic teacher. 
The previous paragraph is not intended to be at all condescending.  
Arithmetic teachers are simply more important than professors of literature, 
and immeasurably more important than professors of law.  Indeed, in a 
better world we would have a lot more of them and a lot fewer of us, and in 
that better world they would be paid much more than we are.  But 
regardless of the comparative worth of the two professions, it is clear to 
most university professors and most elementary school teachers that the two 
professions are very different.  But it is also clear, as the questions from our 
airline companions make clear, that a widespread view understands 
university professors as teachers pure and simple, with the goal of 
imparting knowledge and skills to a classroom of students. 
Under this view – the academic as teacher – it is hardly clear that 
scholarship in Fish’s sense is part of the job at all, nor even clear that the 
degree of pedagogical independence that Fish (and I) and many others 
associate with university professors is a necessary component of the 
university teacher’s responsibilities.  Fourth grade arithmetic teachers, after 
all, typically teach to a lesson plan substantially set by their supervisors, 
and are given little leeway in modifying it.  And under this conception of a 
university professor – teacher of older children, to be sure, but primarily 
teacher – most conceptions of academic freedom are simply not on the table 
at all. 
Understanding the university professor as teacher, and as someone 
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who has little choice about what to teach, is not an understanding of the 
profession that I find attractive.  But it is hardly an irrational one, and 
hardly one that does not resonate with what actual professors do in actual 
courses in many actual universities.  And thus, once again Fish is exposed 
as having a theory, a theory of the academic job, a theory of the academic 
profession, and a theory of the goals and values of academic inquiry, 
whether in the classroom or in scholarship.  His theory is a good one, and I 
wish more people subscribed to it.  But the account that Fish and I share 
does not follow inexorably from the “It’s just a job” conception of 
academic employment.  “It’s just a job” is, once again, delightfully 
deflationary, but all of the work is done by the choice among competing 
plausible conceptions of just what the job is.  And without an account – or 
theory, if you will – of why Fish’s conception is superior to the others we 
are at a loss to see the payoff from the “It’s just a job” conception of just 
what an academic is and does. 
III 
What is perhaps Fish’s most interesting gambit is the move he makes 
from the “It’s just a job” understanding of academic employment, or even 
of the academic profession, to the view that it is somehow inappropriate for 
courts to enforce academic independence in the name of the First 
Amendment.  To reach this conclusion, however, Fish needs a theory of the 
First Amendment, a theory of rights, and a theory of judicial review.  And 
so we must look at each of these in turn. 
With respect to the First Amendment, Fish appears to believe that First 
Amendment rights are individual rights in some strong sense.  For him, the 
right to free speech, if there is such a right at all, would be in the 
neighborhood of the right to the free exercise of religion – an individual 
right against majoritarian decision-making, and a right ultimately grounded 
not in policy, utilitarian, or even more broadly consequentialist 
considerations, but in the deontological foundations of the right itself.  Just 
as the right against torture is based on the simple wrongness of torture, no 
matter how many good consequences an act of torture might produce, and 
the right to free exercise of religion is not defeated by a demonstration that 
the welfare or happiness of the majority would be enhanced by denying to 
the minority the right to exercise their religion, so too, according to a 
considerable number of commentators, is the right to free speech a species 
of the same genus, with an individual’s right to speak being a simple right 
of people by virtue of their humanity.8 
 
8 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); Charles Fried, 
The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Joseph 
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Fish, like myself,9 and like our fellow symposiast Larry Alexander,10 
has little truck with such an account of the right to free speech, but he 
appears to believe that if free speech is not an individual right in this sense 
then it is not a right at all.  But that is simply a mistake.  As one of Fish’s 
nemeses has argued,11 free speech might be either a right in the just 
described sense or it might just be a good policy.  Thus, free speech might 
simply be the policy determination that government excesses are best 
prevented if the press has certain rights against governmental or majority 
control,12 or that consumers will make better choices if they have access to 
certain kinds of commercial information.13  Consequently, if – and it is a 
big if – it is determined that university education might be better with less 
political interference, or that research by university academics and others 
might be more effective if similarly immunized from majoritarian control, 
then the conclusion of this policy judgment will be recognition of one 
aspect of a right to free speech.  It is not that free speech generates a right to 
academic freedom of a certain kind, but rather that the policy advantages of 
academic independence/freedom, if indeed they exist, generate one 
dimension of a right to free speech.  Many constitutional rights simply 
reflect policy judgments, including the policy judgments about who should 
make the policy judgments,14 and there is no reason to believe that 
academic independence could not be subject to the same kind of policy 
calculation. 
IV 
The foregoing is not merely about constitutional rights.  It is about 
rights in general.  A common mistake is to think of legal rights as 
 
Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1991); Martin H. 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-
Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 283 (2011); Susan H. Williams, Free Speech 
and Autonomy: Thinkers, Storytellers, and a Systemic Approach to Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 399 
(2011). 
9 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Frederick 
Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81; Frederick Schauer, On the 
Relationship Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 
(2011); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993). 
10 LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005). 
11 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 373 (1985). 
12 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
521 (1977). 
13 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
14 See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); Frederick Schauer, Institutions 
as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1746 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an 
Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005); Frederick Schauer, Principles, 
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998). 
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necessarily embodying or protecting moral or political rights, rights that 
have a pre-legal existence.  But although some legal rights do indeed have 
this status,15 many do not.  After MacPherson v. Buick,16 for example, New 
Yorkers have a right to recover against the manufacturer of a defective 
automobile, just as residents of the United Kingdom, after Donoghue v. 
Stevenson,17 have a similar right to recover against bottlers of beverages 
who allow the remains of decomposed animals to remain in their products.  
Similarly, American landowners have rights against the owners of coal 
mines whose mines cause surface land to collapse, and under Article I, 
section 26 of the Florida Constitution, Florida residents have the right to 
keep 70% of the first $250,000 of any recovery in a medical malpractice 
action and 90% of anything above that amount. 
It should be obvious that the rights just noted are neither profound nor, 
one might suppose, morally mandated.  They are simply the remedies that 
enforce policy determinations, and that implement of policy determinations 
– no more and no less.18  But much the same can be said about academic 
freedom.  What we think of as academic freedom might simply be the 
consequentialist policy determination that better research will be done if 
research design and implementation is entrusted to university professors 
than if left to the elected members of a state legislature.  Or academic 
freedom might instead, or in addition, be the product of a policy decision 
and an empirical assessment that university students will come to have a 
better appreciation or understanding of literature if the curriculum of the 
English department is set by English professors than if it is set by the 
attorney general or governor of a state, or even by a state’s department of 
education.  Thus, it is possible to understand academic employment, 
academic instruction at the university level, and academic research in 
similarly “It’s just a job” terms, but still believe that the job might be done 
better if academics are given certain legal rights against interference by 
those who might be expected to be less competent or might be predicted to 
have different constituencies.  That we (and, to be sure, the AAUP) choose 
to attach the label “academic freedom” to this policy determination should 
not be taken to suggest that anything deeply moral is going on, and thus the 
claim that nothing profoundly moral or extraordinarily important is at issue 
 
15 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
16 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
17 [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). 
18 Ronald Dworkin has famously maintained that courts both are and should be in the rights 
business and not, except insofar as they are interpreting policy-based statutes, in the policy business.  
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 221-224, 243-244, 338-339 (1986); DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 33-
103.  But as a descriptive matter, Dworkin’s claim is almost certainly false, for common law 
adjudication, and the rights that common law adjudication creates and recognizes, are soaked with 
policy considerations.  See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). 
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does not entail the conclusion that academic freedom is an empty idea.  
“Academic freedom” is best understood as the legal term for a legal right, 
and for a legal right that emerges out of a policy judgment.  And because so 
many rights are in fact premised on policy judgments, the fact that the right 
that gets labeled as “academic freedom” should be cause for neither alarm 
nor celebration. 
V 
Once we understand the notion of a right in these deflationary terms, 
we can understand as well that judicial enforcement of these rights is 
nothing more than a particular mechanism of institutional design.  Just as 
we have the “It’s just a job” school of academic employment, so too might 
we have the “It’s just a job” school of judicial power.19  Some decisions are 
best made by workers and others by the foreman.  Some decisions are best 
made by patients and others by the physician.  And some decisions are best 
made by legislatures, or in collective bargaining, and others are best made 
by judges.  Fish argues that the “It’s just a job” view of academic 
employment entails the conclusion that the rights and responsibilities of 
academics are better worked out in collective bargaining than in the courts, 
and as a contingent empirical and policy question of institutional design, 
that may at some times and in some places be so.  But the conclusion only 
follows necessarily from the premise if we think courts are or should be 
exclusively in the business of enforcing rights in the deep sense.  But the 
“It’s just a job” school of federal judging, a school to which I profess 
considerable allegiance, rejects such claims.  There might be rights in the 
strongest and deepest and most moral sense that are best left to legislatures 
to protect,20 and there might be roles that are given to judges that have little 
to do with rights.21  And if this is so, then the question whether the 
delineation of the nature of academic employment should be left to those 
whose job is to pound the table in the bargaining room or instead to those 
whose job is to put on a black robe and make a decision supported by 
written reasons is simply a second-order policy decision of institutional 
design.  It appears, however, that Fish, who embraces the “It’s just a job” 
view of academic employment, has a rather grander view of judging, a view 
that leads him not to want judges to sully their exalted hands with the nitty-
gritty business of the terms of academic work.  But it is possible to believe 
that making such determinations might be something that judges would be 
 
19 Ironically, perhaps, Fish seems resistant to thinking of judges and what they do in “It’s just a 
job” terms. 
20 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999). 
21 See note 18 and accompanying text, supra. 
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good at, and if we think, in some times and in some places and on some 
issues, that this is so, then it might be useful to have a label for the decision 
to empower judges in this way.  And in fact we do.  The label is “academic 
freedom.”  But it is just a label. 
VI 
We should not fault Fish too much for being taken in by the First 
Amendment rhetoric that surrounds most discussions of academic freedom.  
What we have is simply another instantiation of the phenomenon of First 
Amendment opportunism.22  At least in the post-1960s United States, the 
First Amendment has a certain kind of cultural resonance and doctrinal 
power.  As a result, good lawyers will try to frame their arguments in First 
Amendment terms, just as good politicians try to connect their policy ideas 
to the images of the founding fathers or Abraham Lincoln or the soldiers of 
the Second World War, just as manufacturers use endorsements to connect 
their products with popular and attractive celebrities, and just as denizens of 
my university try to frame all of their arguments about everything in terms 
of Thomas Jefferson’s supposed beliefs and imagined preferences.  “Mark 
you this, Bassanio, even the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose,” 
remarked Antonio in The Merchant of Venice,23 as a way of pointing out the 
ease with which people can find in the Bible something to add credibility to 
whatever their argument happens to be, and the First Amendment appears 
to operate in much the same way.  Precisely because of the cultural salience 
and social attractiveness of the very idea of the First Amendment, good 
advocates, whether in court or in public debate, will try to find a First 
Amendment hook on which to hang all varieties of claims having little 
connection with what we might think of as the core goals of the ideas of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
Thus, there is nothing exalted or inevitable in the fact that the First 
Amendment now protects the right of a liquor store to advertise its prices24 
or the right of a political candidate to claim to have won medals he has not 
 
22 See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE 
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).  See also 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, The “Speech-ing” of 
Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347 (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva 
Siegel eds., 2004). 
23 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 3. 
24 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).  On the opportunistic use of the 
First Amendment and its “commercial advertising” dimension to make decisions whose aims have far 
more to do with economic libertarianism than freedom of speech, see Thomas Jackson & John Jeffries, 
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
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earned,25 or the way in which it is now often argued that the First 
Amendment guarantees the right to harass one’s fellow workers at the 
workplace,26 or to steal someone else’s computer program.27  All of these 
instances, and there are countless others, are simply examples of lawyers 
and their clients doing what good lawyers do – seizing on what appears to 
be a good argument and then bending the core of the argument to suit their 
purposes.  This, quite simply, is First Amendment opportunism, and it is all 
around us. 
And so we should not be surprised to see academics and their lawyers 
doing very much the same thing.  If, like most other people, academics 
would prefer to do their jobs with a minimum of external interference, and 
if they think they can secure this goal in the courts, then it is simply good 
strategy to try to clothe the arguments for professional independence in the 
mantle of the First Amendment.  Given the cultural salience of the First 
Amendment, we should not be surprised or shocked when interest groups 
such as university professors adopt this strategy.  And we should not be 
surprised when their lawyers help them do it, and pick the best forum for 
advancing these claims.  What we see is nothing more or less than good 
political strategy and good lawyering.  The good lawyer is using the 
language and the concept that will most likely secure the desired result.  
And so it goes, because being a good lawyer is very like being a good 
academic.  In both cases, it’s just a job. 
VII 
Thus, Fish’s account of academic freedom is an account that is erected 
on a foundation of a theory of the job in which the employee has some say 
in delineating the nature of a job, a theory of academic employment that 
views it as a professional calling with a certain range of knowledge-seeking 
goals, a theory of the First Amendment that sees the First Amendment as 
largely a policy-independent individual right in the strong sense, a theory of 
rights that understands rights as necessarily being something other than the 
legal implementation of a policy decision, and a theory of judging that 
excludes judges from the kinds of policy decisions that are frequently 
worked out in legislatures or at the bargaining table. 
Each of Fish’s five theories is at least plausible, and some or all of 
them may even be sound.  But they are theories nonetheless, unless one 
 
25 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
26 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting 
the argument). 
27 The issue is explored, and with more sympathy than I would give it, in Stuart Minor Benjamin, 
Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013).  For the contrasting view, see Tim Wu, 
Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1498 (2013). 
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adopts a theory of theories (as Fish does, here and elsewhere) that 
essentially renders not only the idea of a theory, but the associated ideas of 
an account, an explanation, or a justification empty.28  Yet once we see that 
each of Fish’s theories is contestable, we can see as well that little is gained 
by denying their theoretical status.  Indeed, much may be lost if we fail to 
do so.  The most attractive part of Fish’s “It’s just a job” account of 
academic employment and academic freedom is its deflationary tone.  But 
that tone is itself built on a theory of just what it is to be an academic, and a 
theory of just who should make what kinds of decisions in a college or 
university environment.  We could say in response, “It’s just a theory,” but 
Fish’s argument is more than that.  He doesn’t think that “It’s just a theory.”  
He believes it is the right theory.  But to see whether it is in fact the right 
theory, we have to begin by recognizing that it is, after all, a theory. 
 
 
 
28 As he made clear in his oral comments at this Symposium, Fish embraces the idea of an 
“account,” even a normative one, just as he rejects the idea or value of a “theory.”  Fish’s theory of 
theories, therefore, seems to understand what a theory is in a way that distinguishes a theory from a 
causal explanation and from a generalized normative prescription.  That he does so, however, highlights 
the way in which his theory of theories is non-standard, and quite different from the theory of theories 
implicit in this Comment. 
